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It is no accident that the Euromaidan revolution from November 2013 was 
WULJJHUHG E\ 3UHVLGHQW 9LNWRU <DQXNRY\FK¶V GHFLVLRQ WR SRVWSRQH VLJQLQJ WKH
Association Agreement with the European Union. This paper traces the 
connection between a certain type of Ukrainian state building, here labelled as 
monist, and the larger context of European institution building based on the EU, 
which from the pan-European perspective is also monist. These two monist 
projects, which fail systemically to allow for alternatives and pluralistic diversity, 
feed off and mutually reinforce each other. Neither in structural terms can imagine 
alternatives existing outside of themselves. Both are deeply plural internally, but 
claim certain hegemonic privileges. By contrast, projects for the constitutional 
incorporation of pluralistic diversity in Ukraine offer the perspective of national 
reconciliation, and this would be facilitated by the advancement of some sort of 
greater European pluralism that would obviate the need to choose between 
alternative integration projects. The Ukraine syndrome is part of the broader 
failure in the post-Cold War years to create an inclusive European political order. 
 




Introduction: the Ukraine syndrome 
 
The crisis of state building and national development in Ukraine has deep roots and 
complex interactions, but ultimately it reflects the tension between two contrasting 
models of post-communist consolidation. The first is the monist model, which focuses on 
the priority development of a culturally distinctive and politically assertive form of 
Ukrainian nationalism. The monist approach cannot be reduced to the integral 
nationalism of earlier periods, but it nevertheless draws on the power of the idea that 
there is some sort of coherent and autonomous essence to the Ukrainian nation that needs 
to be rediscovered and given hegemonic articulation in the contemporary polity. This is a 
type of restorative nationalism, seeking to correct perceived earlier distortions of the 
Ukrainian national idea. Ukraine is not unique in advancing this sort of nationalism, and 
it fits into classic patterns of post-colonial development. In post-communist Ukraine this 
monist model was relatively capacious, beginning with the generous offer of citizenship 
to all those living in Ukraine at the time of independence. Nevertheless, there is an 
exclusionary and didactic dynamic at work, seeking to establish an identity that would 
distinguish it from Russia, famously articulated by Leonid Kuchma (2003) in his book 
Ukraine is Not Russia. This trend was intensified in response to developmental and 
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political failures. The Euromaidan revolution in 2014 further radicalised the monist 
element, and as a result of internal conflict and war is now presented by the current 
leadership as the only authentic form of Ukrainian development. 
On the other side, a more pluralistic understanding of the challenges facing the 
country draws on postcolonial theory to suggest that the emergence of a hybrid and 
heterogeneous nation is something to be celebrated and given constitutional form in terms 
of linguistic and territorial diversity. The pluralist view is derived from the pattern of 
Ukrainian state and national development over the centuries, which in the twentieth 
century gave rise to a high degree of territorial contingency. Ukraine is far from the only 
country combining a multiplicity of national identities, but it is one of the few that has so 
persistently refused to give constitutional expression to this diversity. Toleration is not 
the same as the transformative incorporation of diversity at the level of the state. Given 
the unstable and typically disastrous history of previous attempts at creating an 
independent Ukraine, concern about territorial integrity and national coherence is 
understandable, but as a result tensions are generated that undermine the intended goal. 
This is all the more paradoxical since opinion surveys almost universally agree that 
GHVSLWH µany linguistic, political, or cultural differences, the vast majority of Ukrainians 
FRQVLGHU8NUDLQHWKHLUPRWKHUODQG¶)RPLQD. Before the crisis this also applied 
to Crimea and the Donbas. Thus the fundamental challenge is not the existential one of 
survival, but how best to incorporate diversity. 
Although the monist project contains profoundly pluralistic characteristics, the 
problem lies at the level of the political integration of difference. The struggle is not over 
whether Ukraine should exist as an independent state, but what sort of state it should be ± 
and most crucially, who has the right to decide. The pluralist cause is not helped by the 
typically segmented way in which its claims have been presented, privileging one group 
at the expense of others while typically failing to generate an enunciated commitment to 
those cultural and other features that make Ukraine unique. Consociationalism on the 
Lijphart model is based on segmented autonomy, and hence in conditions of the 
perceived fragility of Ukrainian statehood was rejected in favour of a unitary model (for 
the debates on post-communist Ukrainian state building, see Kuzio, D'Anieri and 
Kravchuk (eds) 1999; Kuzio and D'Anieri (eds) 2002). Even more damaging, 
representations of pluralism (including appeals for federalism) became associated with 
the ambitions of an external power, Russia, and thus delegitimated in the eyes of the 
monists. Domestic concerns about state integrity and national coherence were 
exacerbated by the competitive international environment.  
The failure to achieve a broader pan-European political settlement after the Cold 
War reinforced the Ukraine syndrome of restorative state building. Lacking in the recent 
period has been an open and generous debate about ways of ensuring territorial integrity 
and linguistic diversity while ensuring the adequate development of the Ukrainian 
language and culture to sustain the Ukrainian state building endeavour. Instead, the 
history of post-independence Ukraine has been characterised by unresolved and often 
suppressed questions of national coherence and state integration that in the end 
undermined both. These tensions were internationalised, provoking the gravest European 
security crisis RIUHFHQWWLPHV7KLVLQVKRUWLVWKHµ8NUDLQHV\QGURPH¶ 
The tension between monist and pluralist interpretations of Ukrainian national 
identity is at the heart of the Ukraine syndrome, and has been a characteristic feature of 
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national development in the modern era. The syndrome was intensified in the post-Cold 
War years as Ukraine gained the status of an independent and sovereign state and was 
forced to devise an autochthonous model of state and nation building. The tension 
between the monist and pluralist models was exacerbated by the unresolved character of 
European international politics. In the quarter century of the cold peace between 1989 
and 2014 none of the fundamental issues of European security or of continental identity 
were resolved, provoking the breakdown of 2014. The Ukraine syndrome was 
internationalised, while international conflict was internalised (Sakwa 2016a). 
The Ukraine crisis was one of the gravest challenges to world peace of our age, 
yet it is remarkable how little theoretical analysis there has been about what led us into 
this abyss. Even more remarkable is the near total absence of a substantive language to 
describe the processes that generated the Ukraine syndrome. This has been accompanied 
by the general coarsening of public discourse on the causes, nature and consequences of 
the Ukraine syndrome, which itself is only a symptom of the broader failures of the post-
Cold War era. This paper is informed by the enormously rich and diverse literature on 
Ukrainian state and national building since 1991, but its purpose is not to rehearse the 
arguments or review the material, but to offer an interpretive framework that can help 
make sense of how domestic and international factors combined to create the Ukraine 
syndrome.  
 
Crisis in the borderlands: between norms and space 
 
The European Union is often portrayed as a post-modern entity committed to a post-
Westphalian agenda of universal values, accompanied by commitment to a set of 
normative principles (Cooper 2003). 1  7KHVH QRUPV DUH WKH EDVLV IRU WKH (8¶V
conditionality in dealing with external actors and its neighbours. Enlargement has pushed 
the EU into uncharted territory, in both symbolic and political terms (Zielonka 2008). At 
the same time, competing representations of Europe are part of the contentious debates 
RYHU QDWLRQDO LGHQWLW\ LQ WKH FRXQWULHV WKDW ILQG WKHPVHOYHV LQ WKH QHZ µERUGHUODQGV¶ 
(White and Feklyunina 2014). 
The tension between spatiality and normativity is particularly stark when it comes 
to the six Eastern Partnership (EaP) states ± Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia. +HUH 5XVVLD¶V KLVWRULFDO JUDYLWDWLRQDO SXOO LV HQKDQFHG E\ WKH
increasingly intense logic of competition with the EU. The EU remains an ambitious 
transformative agent in what are increasingly contested neighbourhoods. It is this which 
brought the EU into confrontation with Russia. The EU devoted enormous effort to 
devise µneighbourhood¶ policies that would prevent the outer limits of EU territory 
hardening into new lines of division. When presenting the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) in Brussels on 5-6 December 2002, the president of the European 
Commission at the time, Romano Prodi (2002) VWUHVVHG WKDW µ, ZDQW WR VHH D ³ULQJ RI
IULHQGV´ Vurrounding the Union and its closest European neighbours, from Morocco to 
5XVVLDDQGWKH%ODFN6HD¶ The ENP sought to mediate between the ins and outs as part 
RI WKH (8¶V SHUPDQHQW QHJRWLDWLRQ RI ERXQGDULHV DQG LQWHUDFWLRQV ZLWK QHLJKERXUV 
                                                 
1
 6RPH RI WKH LGHDV LQ WKLV VHFWLRQ GUDZ IURP P\ µ([WHUQDO $FWRUV LQ (8-Russia Relations: 
%HWZHHQ1RUPVDQG6SDFH¶Special Report produced by LSE IDEAS and the 'Dahrendorf Forum 
- Debating Europe' on the future of EU-Russia relations in the context of the Ukraine crisis. 
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(Rumelli 2004; Whitman and Wolff 2010). :LWKWKHµELJEDQJ¶DFFHVVLRQRIDQXPEHURI
post-communist countries in 2004 and 2007, most of which had been part of the Soviet 
EORF RU HYHQ RI WKH 6RYLHW 8QLRQ LWVHOI WKH FKDUDFWHU RI WKLV µQHJRWLDWLRQ¶ FKDQJHG ,W
became less of an interactive process (to the degree that it ever was), and became 
increasingly didactic (Prozorov 2016). 7KH(D3ZDVVSRQVRUHGE\VRPHRI5XVVLD¶VPRVW
resolute critics in Poland and Sweden (Copsey and Pomorska 2014). The EaP was toned 
down by the more conciliatory member states and the Brussels bureaucracy, but the 
programme, however poorly funded and under-resourced, represented a normative 
challenge that increasingly assumed a delineated spatial form. 
The expansionary dynamic through accession has now slowed, but the impulse for 
integration through Association Agreements and the accompanying Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) remains strong. There is no finalité in either 
spatial or normative terms, although there are numerous practical obstacles. One of these 
is that the EU is no longer expanding into non-contested territory but is running into an 
alternative gravity field, primarily the one generated by Russia. It was the contest 
between alternative integration projects that came to a head in 2013 and sparked off the 
chain of events that provoked the Euromaidan revolution and the flight of the incumbent 
president, Viktor Yanukoych (Dragneva and Wolczuk 2015). Ukrainian governments had 
long been challenged by competing foreign policy orientations, a forced choice that 
interacted with domestic regimes to exacerbate the tension between monist and pluralist 
representations of Ukrainian identity (on the problematic of forced choices, see 
Korosteleva 2015). Despite claims to represent a post-sovereigntist normative order, 
VSDWLDOLW\ LV GHHSO\ HPEHGGHG LQ WKH (8¶V SUDFWLFDO HQJDJHPHQW ZLWK LWV QHLJKERXUV 
Although envisaged as a way of obviating geopolitical contestation, the contradiction 
between normative assertions and spatial advance became apparent when entering the 
µVKDUHGQHLJKERXUKRRG¶. 
Relations with Russia soured and an increasingly overt struggle for influence 
intensified in what became a contested neighbourhood, the traditional borderlands 
between the two major zones of Europe in the intermarium between the Baltic and Black 
seas (DeBardeleben 2008). For the EU, this meant that pragmatism threatened to 
undermine its normative idealism as hard choices had to be made when dealing with a 
new type of recalcitrant regime. Hitherto it had been mostly plain sailing for the EU, 
extending its influence to regions that welcomed the EU as the path to political and 
economic modernisation. The complexities of the Balkans were a foretaste of the 
problems to come, but it was in the new Eastern Europe that the EU for the first time 
FDPH XS DJDLQVW D ULYDO KHJHPRQLF HQWHUSULVH 7KH UHVXOW ZDV GLVDVWURXV 5XVVLD¶V
traditional mode of engagement with the EU as a mix of conflict and cooperation 
gradually gave way to a more antagonistic relationship in which the alleged struggle 
between norms was central (for a critical view, see Casier 2013). For the EU, this 
provoked intense soul-searching over issues of (XURSH¶VVHOI-identity and purpose. If the 
EU could not be the bringer of peace, then it would be little different from the rest of the 
Atlantic community of which it considered itself the leading civilian and normative part. 
In both Russia and the EU the confrontation thus assumed almost existential proportions.  
The clash between norms and spatiality was predictably at its starkest over 
Ukraine. No other external actor has more poisoned relations between Russia and the EU.  
The Orange revolution of autumn 2004 saw Russia and the EU for the first time line up 
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behind opposing camps. The administration of Viktor Yushchenko in the end fell prey to 
the elite conflicts that have so bedevilled Ukrainian politics since independence, tempting 
both Russia and the EU to align with shifting internal factions. The result was the two gas 
shut-offs in 2006 and 2009, which inflicted irreparable damage on the Russian-EU 
energy relationship, irrespective of who was right in the conflicts themselves. Russia 
would have been well advised to stay its hand and ride out the turmoil, rather than adding 
a damaging quotient of unpredictability and coercion. In Ukraine, as elsewhere, energy 
dependency interacted with the struggle over energy rents in domestic politics 
(Balmaceda 2008, 2013: 93-153).  
The EU and Ukraine had been negotiating some sort of Association Agreement 
since 2007, but as the time approached for Ukraine to sign the document at the third 
Eastern Partnership summit scheduled to meet in Vilnius 28-29 November 2013, the 
logic of binary choice became predominant. Yanukovych had finally won the presidency 
in February 2010, and he soon sought revenge against his long-term rival and idol of the 
Orange revolution, Yulia Tymoshenko. In 2011 she was jailed after an abusive and 
politically-motivated trial. By now Russia had intensified its own integration project, in 
the form of what on 1 January 2015 formally became the Eurasian Economic Union 
(EEU). This provoked DGDQJHURXVµFODVKRILQWHJUDWLRQV¶LQZKDWZDVbecoming a direct 
confrontation over space, garlanded on both sides in the language of norms. When 
Yanukovych on 21 November 2013 announced that he would postpone signing the AA, 
crowds gathered in the Maidan, and following an inept and violent police intervention on 
1RYHPEHUWKHµ(XURPDLGDQ¶UHYROXWLRQZDVLQIXOOVZLQJ  
Although provoked by contingent factors, notably the inept and ill-timed 
UHSUHVVLYH PHDVXUHV RI  1RYHPEHU WKH µUHYROXWLRQ RI GLJQLW\¶ reflected popular 
frustration over the long-term impasse in Ukrainian national development and the 
constraints imposed by failure to create a benign pan-European security and 
developmental environment. For many, Russia is the guilty party, pressurising Ukraine to 
make a choice in favour of Eurasian integration and then intervening at the moment of 
WKH FRXQWU\¶V JUHDWHVW YXOQHrability (Wilson 2014). Others argue that the West is 
responsible, having failed to create the inclusive security order that had been promised at 
the end of the Cold War, and instead only intensified the institutional and ideational 
IRXQGDWLRQVRIWKHµROG :HVW¶DSURFHVVWKDWZRXOGLQHYLWDEO\VRRQHURUODWHUSURYRNHD
reaction from Russia (Mearsheimer 2014) 7KH ODWWHU YLHZ VXJJHVWV WKDW µ5XVVLDQ
DJJUHVVLRQ¶ZDVQRWDIXQFWLRQRIWKHFRXQWU\¶VGRPHVWLFRUGHUEXWVWUXFWXUDOO\FRQWLQJHQW
on the contradictions of the international system. My argument is rather more specific. 
Liberal pluralism was not given adequate political form within Ukraine, and at the 
European level the EU emerged as a hegemonic project unable to relate effectively with 
the pluralistic state system on the continent that was the inevitably concomitant of the 
failure to create a greater West or a greater Europe.  
The European dimension to the Ukraine syndrome is thus crucial (for stimulating 
essays on what went wrong in EU-Russian relations in the context of Ukraine, see Magri 
(ed.) 2015; see also Haukkala 2015; and Nitoiu 2014). It was no accident that the 
revolutionary breakdown of February 2014 was provoked by plans to move towards 
µ(XURSH¶ 7KH FODVK RI LQWHJUDWLRQV DVVXPHG D VHYHUHO\ spatial aspect but it was also a 




post-Cold War environment, and hence it defends the framework of international law and 
European security created in the 1990s. By contrast, Russia has from the first felt 
excluded and rejected as a founding member of the new order. It proved impossible to 
ILQGDFDSDFLRXVHQRXJKYHUVLRQRI WKHµJUHDWHU:HVW¶ LQZKLFK5XVVLDZRXOGKDYHhad 
space to develop as an equal, and instead only an expanded version of the old West was 
on offer. Russia was reduced to the status of a country that had to prove its credentials to 
EH DOORZHG LQ 5XVVLD ZDV D µWUDQVLWLRQDO¶ VWDWH, but in the Russian perception 
µWUDQVLWLRQDOLW\¶GLGQRWPHDQVXEDOWHUQLW\7KLVLVZK\3XWLQUHMHFWHGWKHYHU\QRWLRQRI
µWUDQVLWLRQ¶IURPWKHYHU\ILUVWGD\VRIKLVSUHVLGHQF\DQGHYHQPRUHWKHLPSOLFLWQRWLRQ
of Russia as a supplicant. The gulf widened between the enormous transformative 
challenges facing the country and its self-perception as a great power by right and 
historical achievement. It is out of these incommensurate narratives of both time and 
space that the Ukraine crisis emerged.  
 
Monism and pluralism 
 
Monism does not mean the absence of internal pluralism but instead refers to the overall 
conception of an entity and its ability to engage with others on the basis of equality rather 
than hierarchy. By that definition, the EU as a whole is also ultimately a monist project. 
Although intensely pluralistic internally, the EU is monist to the degree that it cannot 
envisage an alternative to itself on the European continent. Accession countries have to 
absorb the acquis in a unilateral mannHU DQG QRZ µLQWHJUDWLRQ¶ FRXQWULHV DORQJ LWV
periphery are called on to adapt to EU norms if they wish to take advantage of its 
enormous market and cultural power. There is a monist dynamic at the very heart of the 
µZLGHU (XURSH¶ SURMHFW WKH YLVLRQ RI DQ expanding economic and security community 
based in Brussels. This took more delineated forms with the creation of the ENP, and 
even more so with the launch of EaP in May 2009.  
At the same time, the EU is increasingly embedded in the Atlantic security system 
(confirmed by the Lisbon Treaty), which is also an all-encompassing that gained a 
hegemonic status in Europe after the demise of the Warsaw Pact. By contrast, since at 
least the mid-V5XVVLDKDVEHHQDGYDQFLQJWKHLGHDRIDµJUHDWHU(XURSH¶ERO¶VKaya 
Evropa)GUDZLQJRQ*RUEDFKHY¶VFRQFHSWRID&RPPRQ(XURSHDQ+RPHcomprised of 
several autonomous entities, including above all the EU, Russia and Turkey, but united 
on a common vision of a deepening European pan-continental political, economic and 
security community. This community would finally be able to create a free trade area 
from Lisbon to Vladivostok, accompanied by visa-free travel and intensified cultural, 
educational and investment ties. This is a pluralist vision of a multipolar Europe driven 
E\ LWV UHIXVDO WR DFFHSW WKH QRUPDWLYH SULRULW\ RI D VLQJOH HQWLW\ RU PRGHO 5XVVLD¶V
espousal of pluralism at the international level is in sharp contrast to monist political 
practices at home ZKHUHDV WKH (8¶V GRPHVWLF SOXUDOLVP LV EDODQFHG E\ IRUHLJQ policy 
monism. 
The double dynamic of Ukrainian and European monism combined with 
devastating effect, provoking a new division of Europe. 8NUDLQH¶V µ(XURSHDQ FKRLFH¶
drew its energy from the monist practices of EU foreign policy engagement, reinforcing 
GRPHVWLFPRQLVP(TXDOO\8NUDLQH¶VPRQLVWLPSXOVHVWKUHDWHQWRUHLQIRUFHWKHPRQLVP
of EU foreign engagement in Europe, above all when it comes to relations with Russia. 
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Indeed, the contradictions of EU foreign engagement have only intensified since 2014, 
ZKHUHDUDQJHRISUDJPDWLFUHODWLRQVZLWKWKHFRXQWULHVµLQ-EHWZHHQ¶DERYHDOOWKHRWKHU
members of the EaP, was determined primarily by their standing in the EU-Russian 
FRQIOLFW 7KXV 8NUDLQH¶V PRQLVP ZKLFK KDV DOZD\V EHHQ ODUJHO\ JHQHUDWHG E\
repudiation of the political and institutional aspects of engagement with Russia, has been 
generalised to Europe as a whole. To that degree, the Ukraine syndrome has become the 
nemesis of the DVSLUDWLRQVIRUDµ(XURSHZKROHDQGIUHH¶DVHQXQFLDWHGLQWKH&KDUWHUof 
Paris for a New Europe of November 1990 (Charter 1990). Instead, Europe is as divided 
as it was before 1989, if not more so. The crisis since 2014 is effectively a struggle for 
systemic and institutional pluralism at the continental and national levels. 
The struggle between monism and pluralism is also apparent at the 
epistemological level, shaping the way that the crisis is understood and handled. In 
essence, the whole sub-discipline of democratisation studies and its associated 
transitology literature is monist, in the sense that it is associated with a deeply embedded 
teleology. Although most of the literature is well aware that the road to democracy is a 
bumpy one, with many side turns and obstacles, the desired direction of travel frames the 
discussion. When it comes to Ukraine, the temporal teleology of transition is 
accompanied by the spatial dimension RILWVYHUVLRQRIWKHµUHWXUQWR(XURSH¶ 
The most eloquent expression of the Western monist line comes from Timothy 
Snyder, professor of history at Yale University. In his contribution to a special section on 
Ukraine in Slavic Review KHQRWHVWKDWµ,WLVQot so often that a true revolution takes place 
in Europe, mobilizing more than a million, provoking counter-revolution and mass 
NLOOLQJ¶ (Snyder 2015: 695). He places the recent Ukrainian events in the longue durée of 
the twentieth century movement towards decolonisation and disintegration provoked by 
:RUOG:DU,ZLWKWKHJUHDWPXOWLQDWLRQDOHPSLUHVGLVLQWHJUDWLQJDW WKDWZDU¶VHQG7KH
Soviet Union proved to be only a temporary rassemblement of the bulk of the territories 
of the former Russian Empire, which he argues was a type of colonisation. The 
disintegration of the USSR put an end to this recolonisation period, and now Ukraine 
tried to join Europe in the form of the EU.  
,Q 6Q\GHU¶V WKLQNLQJ WKHUH LV D VWDUN FRQWUDVW EHWZHHQ WKH (8 DV D IRUFH RI
integration, and Russia as a force of disinteJUDWLRQVHHNLQJWRWHDU(XURSHDSDUW5XVVLD¶V
strategy in Ukraine was only an element in its broader goal to destroy the EU as part of 
its aim of creating DQµDOWHUQDWLYHJOREDORUGHU¶ (Snyder 2015: 706). In this interpretation, 
what may be considered to EH 5XVVLD¶V OHJLWLPDWH LQWHUHVWV DUH JLYHQ VKRUW VKULIW DQG
Russia emerges as a demonic force of destruction and destabilisation. The analysis 
UHPRYHV FRPSOH[LW\ DQG FRQWUDGLFWLRQ IURP 5XVVLD¶V EHKDYLRXU DQG LQVWHDG D VLQJOH
impulse is deemed to predominate. This is a classic orientalist reading of a country, 
where its interests are not only denied but delegitimated by imposing on it the syndrome 
of cultural inferiority. 1R OHVV SUREOHPDWLF LV 6Q\GHU¶V DVVXPSWLRQ WKDW WKH 5XVVR-
Ukrainian relationship is a colonial one, an issue to which I shall return below. Certainly, 
5XVVLD¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKH(8KDVVHULRXVO\GHWHULRUDWHGLQUHFHQW\HDUVIRUUDWLRQDOLI
regrettable reasons, but official policy has never come close to suggesting that its 
destructioQ LV 5XVVLD¶V H[SOLFLW JRDO Of course, if European unity is forged through 
opposition to Russia, then Russia will inevitably seek to weaken that unity by 
intensifying bilateral links and supporting movements that are critical of anti-Russian 
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positions. All this is simply a reflection of the profound impasse in which European 
politics finds itself. 
(TXDOO\ 6Q\GHU¶V KHURLF DFFRXQW RI WKH 0DLGDQ UHYROXWLRQ JORVVHV RYHU LWV
contradictions, and neglects facts about the killings and onset of civil conflict that run 
counter to his model. Above all, Snyder has absorbed the monist model of Ukraine, as a 
VLQJOH DFWRU ZLWK D VLQJOH SXUSRVH 7KLV LV UHIOHFWHG LQ WKH UKHWRULF WKDW 5XVVLD¶V
intervention in Ukrainian affairs in 2014 has forged a new Ukrainian identity, and thus 
unwittingly fostered the outcome that it sought to avert. In practice, there was and is no 
unitary Ukrainian identity, and although regional divisions may have changed their form, 
they remain an important structuring factor in Ukrainian politics, just as do class 
divisions between the small oligarch class and the mass of citizens who are sinking ever 
deeper into penury. 8NUDLQH¶Vµ(XURSHDQDVSLUDWLRQV¶ZHUHDOZD\VDSROLWLFDOSURMHFWDQG
the term itself is no more than a political slogan intended to deny and denigrate 
alternatives.  
6Q\GHU¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ IDOOV VKRUWRQERWKHPSLULFDODQG WKHRUHWLFDO JURXQGV$V
Maria Todorova notes in her response to the article, Snyder SURGXFHG µD VLPSOHQRW WR
say simplistic argument, wrapped up in an obfuscatiQJVFKRODUO\JDUE¶ In her view, he 
failed to meet the fundamental criteria of what a public intellectual should strive to 
DFKLHYHµ:KDWLVLURQLFKHUHLVWKDWKHUHWKLVSXEOLFLQWHOOHFWXDOGRHVQRWIROORZWKHXVXDO
way one is supposed to reach the public, namely, unwrapping a complex argument and 
translating it in a way the public can grasp it while at the same time retaining the 
FRPSOH[LW\ DQG SURYLGLQJ D PRUDO FRPSDVV¶ (Todorova 2015: 709). She condemns his 
SUHVHQWDWLRQ RI µD PRQROLWKLF DOPRVW DQWKURSRmorphic Ukraine, without any internal 
GLYHUVLW\¶ (Todorova 2015: 713-14). It is precisely this monist vision of a monolithic 
Ukraine accompanied by monolithic representations of Europe and post-communist 




Ukrainian monism, like its European equivalent, is an intensely contradictory 
phenomenon. The contradictions themselves generate diversity and a societal pluralism 
that has proved fertile soil for a creative and vibrant national culture. Thus Ukrainian 
monism cannot be simply reduced to the integral nationalism espoused by such leading 
ILJXUHV LQ WKH 8NUDLQLDQ QDWLRQDO PRYHPHQW DV 'P\WUR 'RQWVRY DOWKRXJK 'RQWVRY¶V
ideology is one of the most eloquent expressions of a radical Ukrainian monism. Drawing 
the bitter lessons of the failure of Ukraine to establish and defend its independence in the 
years of revolution and civil war between 1917 and 1920, Dontsov in the interwar years 
repudiated his earlier socialism and shaped a new radical Ukrainian nationalism. At the 
heart of his model of state development is a necessary separation from Russia to allow 
Ukraine to thrive as an autonomous political entity, accompanied by the need to 
overcome the residue of affiliation with Poland or Austria. He was ready to embrace the 
use of violence to achieve his model of national goals. Although he did not join the 
Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), his ideas inspired them. The rejection of 
Russia and the complex interactions with its neighbours is taken as the foundational act 
of the new Ukraine.  
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European monism is a model of development that is unable to engage with 
difference on the basis of equality.  In Ukraine a homologous monism was present from 
the beginning of post-communist state development, but has taken increasingly 
radicalised forms in the 200V7KH µ2UDQJH UHYROXWLRQ¶RI Dutumn 2004 combined the 
VWUXJJOH DJDLQVW WKH DSSDUHQW µWKHIW¶ RI WKH SUHVLGHQWLDO HOHFWLRQ ZLWK WKH UHVXUJHQFH RI
Ukrainian monism. Political reform and the escape from economic dependency, 
corruption and stymied development were linked with a more radical rethinking of 
Ukrainian state and nation building (Åslund and McFaul (eds) 2006; Wilson 2006). The 
WUDYDLOV RI 9LNWRU <XVKFKHQNR¶V SUHsidency provoked a degree of disillusion, allowing 
the loser of the 2004 contest, Viktor Yanukovych to make a spectacular and surprising 
comeback by conclusively winning the February 2010 presidential election. 
<DQXNRY\FK¶V years in power were marked by a GHHSHQLQJ RI WKH FRXQWU\¶V
developmental contradictions, with a degradation of the rule of law, the intensification of 
oligarch privileges, worsening corruption and an incoherent foreign policy. The 
institutionalisation of the party system was degraded by the rampant personalism, and 
only few gained a structured and enduring status (Kudelia and Kuzio 2015). The system 
RI µROLJDUFK GHPRFUDF\¶ ZDV XQGHUPLQHG E\ WKH JUHHG RI <DQXNRY\FK¶V IDPLO\ DQG
associates (Matuszak 2012), alienating other oligarchs and tempting them to support the 
Maidan insurgency from November 2013. 
The breakdown of February 2014, which saw Yanukovych flee for his life and the 
installation of a radical nationalist government, appeared to offer the prospect of a 
revolutionary breakthrough. The Maidan revolution was predicated on the belief that the 
escape from the previous constraints of time (backwardness, corruption, neo-Sovietism) 
and space (dependence on Russia, entrapment in an indeterminate intermarium, the 
EDQNUXSWF\RIDµPXOWLYHFWRU¶IRUHLJQSROLF\) could be broken by a radical move towards 
Europe accompanied by an end to the compromises in national development. The 
monism of the radicalised Ukrainian nationalism sought to strip the national enterprise 
from the compromises and obfuscations of the past to allow the birth of a new nation true 
to its fundamental self. This entailed not only adopting a monist version of Ukrainian 
history, but also rejecting core aspects of the Soviet experience (enunciated with a stark 
consistency by Motyl, for example 2015). 7KHµUHWXUQWR(XURSH¶WKHPHWKHIRXQGDWLRQ
myth of the East European revolutions in 1989, was revived and was assumed to embody 
a more democratic and inclusive social order. At the level of governance, the EU does 
indeed advance classic liberal postulates, but as argued above, EU integration is a form of 
monism since it excludes alternatives to itself. Not surprisingly, the EU and radical 
Ukrainian nationalists found common cause on this basis, radicalising both.  
At the heart of the Ukraine syndrome is the political weakness of the balancing 
pluralist forces. Ukraine has always had a remarkably diverse and vibrant political culture 
of debate and contestation, but there has been a notable gulf between this societal 
pluralism and the operative political system. Oligarch power was consolidated in the 
1990s at the meta-political level, and has remained entrenched ever since. The various 
revolutions and overturns since then have been both an expression of resistance to 
oligarch power and a manifestation of that power (Lane 2008). The paradox of the anti-
oligarch Maidan revolution bringing to power a leading oligarch in the form of Petro 
Poroshenko is clear. Ukrainian monist nationalism is now allied with a segment of the 
oligarch class to push through the neoliberal economic reforms demanded by the IMF, 
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the EU and other western institutions. $V9RORG\PU ,VKFKHQNRQRWHV µOHIWZLQJ IRUFHV
ZHUH QRW DEOH WR JDLQ SROLWLFDO KHJHPRQ\ DV D UHVXOW RI WKH PDVV PRELOLVDWLRQV¶
(Ishchenko 2016, 4). He rightly stresses the complex nature of both the Maidan and Anti-
0DLGDQPRYHPHQWVEXWWKHVWUXJJOHZDVQRWVLPSO\EHWZHHQµFRPSHWLQJQDWLRQDOLVPRU
ULYDO LPSHULDOLVW SRZHU¶ ,VKFKHQNR   EXW DOVR DERXW FRPSHWLQJ YLVLRQV RI WKH
future. The revolution did not obviate intra-oligarch struggles, and indeed, in conditions 
of state weakness the gulf between the oligarch meta-political level and the grass-roots 
civic activism that has burgeoned since the Maidan revolution has widened. The creation 
of armed battalions only adds to the inflammatory mix, creating the conditions for 
another revolutionary explosion. So far this has been damped down by the revolutionary 
UHJLPH¶V IRFXV RQ 5XVVLD¶V µDJJUHVVLRQ¶ DQG LQ JHQHUDO RQ WKH H[WHUQDOLVDWLRQ RI
responsibLOLW\ IRU WKH FRXQWU\¶V LOOV, but the constitutional debate over the nature of 
Ukrainian statehood remains on the agenda. 
The monism of the EU is challenged by various alternative spatial imaginaries, 
QRWDEO\ WKH LGHD RI µJUHDWHU (XURSH¶ DV ZHOO DV E\ WKH emergence of various greater 
Eurasian and Asian projects. The weakness of these pluralistic spatial configurations is 
that they lack a sustained ideational component, although the idea of a peaceful and 
multipolar world order at their heart represents the foundations on which some sort of 
alternative order could be developed. This raises the fundamental question of the forms of 
Ukrainian political pluralism. ,QKLVWRULFDO WHUPV WKH5XVVRSKRQHµ0DORUXVVLDQ¶µ/LWWOH
5XVVLDQ¶WUDGLWLRQLVVRPHWLPHVSRVLWHG as the alternative to hegemonic Russian projects 
and the Ukrainian national movement, as well the more amorphous pan-Slavic and pan-
Orthodox concepts (Kiryukhin 2015). In the post-Soviet era this was articulated as the 
idea of two Ukraines, one pro-European and oriented towards modernisation, while the 
other was nostalgic for the Soviet era and traditionalist in its political orientations 
(Ryabczuk 1992, a view that he later revised. See Fomina 2014). This stark contrast 
between development and stagnation was one of the leitmotifs framing the Euromaidan 
revolution.  
At its root is a peculiarly Ukrainian inflection of postcolonial theory arguing that 
the continuing predomiQDQFHRI5XVVLDQODQJXDJHDQGFXOWXUHUHIOHFWV8NUDLQH¶VEURDGHU
postcolonial condition (Sakwa 2015a). Mykola Riabchuk (2002: 48) describes the 
8NUDLQLDQ&UHROHDVRQHµWKDWEHORQJVSULPDULO\WRWKHGHVFHQGDQWVRI5XVVLDQVHWWOHUVDV
well as to those indigenes who had eventually assimilated into the dominant 
5XVVRSKRQH FXOWXUH¶ +H DGYRFDWHV WKH JUDGXDO EXW FRQVLVWHQW DQG GHWHUPLQHG
Ukrainianisation. This would be a state-led programme to rectify the deformations of the 
past to enhance the status of the UNUDLQLDQ ODQJXDJH DQG FXOWXUH ,Q KLV YLHZ µ7KH
Ukrainian state will remain dysfunctional as long as it remains Creole, that is, neither 
8NUDLQLDQ QRU 5XVVLDQ EXW UDWKHU 6RYLHW¶ %\ FRQWUDVW ZLWK WKLV PRQLVW YLHZ WKH
pluralists would argue that the very proximity of the two cultures means that they have 
grown together and both are legitimate inheritors of the modern Ukrainian state. 
3OXUDOLVWVZRXOGDUJXH WKDW WKHYHU\ LGHDRI µLQGLJHQHV¶DQG µVHWWOHUV¶DUH UHLILHG
concepts, and instead argue that nation building in post-communist Ukraine should 
recognise the diversity of paths that its constituent peoples have taken to join the modern 
VWDWHDQG WKXV WKHHWKQRQ\Pµ8NUDLQLDQ¶VKRXOGEHSULPDULO\FLYLF7KLV LV WKHYLHZRI
Mikhail Pogrebinsky, a scholar at the Kiev Centre of Political Research and Conflict 
6WXGLHV ZKR DUJXHV WKDW µ7KH LGHD RI 5XVVLDQV LQ 8NUDLQH EHLQJ D QDWLRQDO PLQRULW\
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similar to, for instance, Hungarians in Romania or Slovakia, Swedes in Finland, or even 
Russians in Estonia, is in fact SURIRXQGO\IDOODFLRXV¶DQGKHFRQGHPQVZHVWHUQSROLFLHV
GHULYHGIURPWKLVIDOVHSUHPLVHµ$FFRUGLQJWRWKDWLGHDWKH8NUDLQLDQVZLWKWKHPRUDO
support of the West, are trying to free themselves from the centuries-old Russian colonial 
oppression, while 0RVFRZ UHVLVWV LW LQ HYHU\ ZD\ DQGDV VRRQDV LW ³OHWV8NUDLQHJR´
(XURSHDQ YDOXHV ZLOO WULXPSK LQ 8NUDLQH¶ (Pogrebinskiy 2015: 91). Ukraine from this 
perspective is a state of all its peoples, and not the property of so-FDOOHGµLQGLJHQHV¶7KLV
unresolved contradiction is at the heart of contemporary struggles. 
A further contradiction lies in the many manifestations of a pluralistic culture and 
society in Ukraine and the weakness of its coherent political representation. Kuchma and 
Yanukovych exploited the various cleavages, but failed programmatically to enunciate 
this putative political pluralism. Kuchma was a notoriously pragmatic president, in the 
worst sense of the word, aQG KLV IRUHLJQ SROLF\ RI µPXOWLYHFWRULVP¶ ODFNHG D VXVWDLQHG
conceptual or straWHJLF IUDPHZRUN 7KLV ZDV D W\SH RI µZHDWKHUYDQH¶ PXOWLYHFWRULVP
which sought to exploit the opportunities and contradictions of geopolitical contestation 
EHWZHHQ 5XVVLD DQG WKH $WODQWLF FRPPXQLW\ $V IRU <DQXNRY\FK KLV DOOHJHG µSUR-
5XVVLDQ¶ FKDUDFWHU was at most situational. Like other oligarchs and his presidential 
predecessors, he sought to take advantage of the opportunities opened up by the failure to 
create a pan-European community. It is noteworthy that his last foreign visit as president 
was to China, where some multi-billion dollars projects, notably in agriculture, were in 
prospect. Equally, his cynical exploitation of domestic cleavages and tensions can hardly 
be labelled pluralistic. They were the internal equivalents of foreign policy 
multivectorism, the opportunistic exploitation of diversity and difference rather than its 
consistent political expression. This was a doubly destructive multivectorism in which 
domestic cleavages were internationalised, and foreign policy dilemmas internalised. 
A more substantive political pluralism would give voice to the syncretic (although 
not essentially artificial) character of the Ukrainian state ± comprised of diverse 
territories and historical experiences and languages. Rather than fearing diversity in 
favour of a monist articulation of Ukrainian identity, the pluralistic vision would embrace 
the many elements that constitute contemporary Ukraine. This inherent political 
pluralism had widespread acceptance in pre-Maidan Ukraine. Even the most recalcitrant 
regions, notably the Donbass and Crimea, recognised their Ukrainian identity, as long as 
there was space for the articulation of difference. The Maidan revolution ruptured this 
pluralistic dimension, and provoked various forms of counter-mobilisation. This 
SOXUDOLVPQDWXUDOO\KDGDQH[WHUQDOGLPHQVLRQ7KLVZDVQRWRSSRUWXQLVWLFµZHDWKHUYDQH¶
multivectorism, but recognised the incipient multipolarity on the European continent to 
create a more grounded form of engagement with the various centres of power. In the 
event, this (literally) grounded or spatial form of multivectorism in Ukraine (unlike in 
Belarus and Kazakhstan) proved still-born, in part because all sides recognised that 
Ukraine was a frontline state, and that compromises here could lead to enduring 
geopolitical disadvantage. The failure to establish some sort of overarching European 
mode of reconciliation on a continental scale proved fatal for Ukraine. European monism 
proved destructive of Ukrainian pluralism. 
 




The Ukraine crisis fundamentally damaged the development of both the EU and Russia, 
and rendered what was already a deteriorating relationship into a conflictual one. Ukraine 
has become the nemesis of a certain vision of a pluralistic Europe, intensifying monism 
in both the EU and Ukraine. The continent is once again being split by an iron curtain, 
this time stretching from Narva on the Baltic to Mariupol on the Sea of Azov (Sakwa 
2015b, 2016b). TKH (8¶V UHSXWDWLRQ LV RQ WKH OLQH KDYLQJ LQYHVWHG VR PXFK RI LWV
SROLWLFDO FDSLWDO LQWR WKHXQFHUWDLQSURMHFWRI8NUDLQH¶V VXFFHVVIXO WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ LQWRD
dynamic and competitive capitalist democracy. The militant exclusive language of the 
Maidan in the name of Europe represented a repudiation of the fundamental values of the 
Europe to which the movement aspired. The EU effectively endorsed the monism of the 
more radical part of the Maidan revolution, while the Atlantic community as a whole for 
obvious structural reasons favoured 5XVVLD¶V VHFXULW\ H[FOXVLRQ IURP 8NUDLQLDQ VSDFH
The point is not that the EU may have been ill-DGYLVHGWRVXSSRUW8NUDLQH¶VGHPRFUDWLF
transformation ± RQWKHFRQWUDU\WKLVLVWKHYHU\HVVHQFHRIWKH(8¶VSROLF\WRZDUGVLWV
neighbours ± but that this has taken place in the absence of an effective larger regional 
mode of reconciliation with other integration projects and state concerns. 7KH (8¶V
monist conception of itself as the only legitimate developmental actor in the European 
continent provoked deleterious and negative consequences. 
%\UHSUHVHQWLQJµ(XURSH¶DV8NUDLQH¶VIXWXUHWKHFROODSVHRIWLPHDQGVSDFHZDV
FRPSOHWH7KHDEVWUDFWLGHDORIµ(XURSH¶KDGORQJEHHQSRVLWHGDVWKHIXWXUHRIWKH(8¶V
neighbours, with the spatial reality becoming a temporal ideal (Judt 2010). Already in 
0LNKHLO 6DDNDVKYLOL¶V *HRUJLD WKLV LGHDO KDG EHFRPH UDGLFDOLVHG DQG ORVW LWV
transformational quality. Instead of seeking to combine the post-modern with the 
normative transcendence of the logic RIVSDWLDOFRQIOLFWµ(XURSH¶EHFDPHWKHLGHRORJ\RI
a militant liberation creed dressed up in the language of anti-colonial liberation, and thus 
became the opposite of itself. The Maidan revolution in Ukraine took this a step further, 
with Europe becoming the focus of a new national identity in opposition to what was 
constructed as neo-Soviet backwardness, corruption and national constriction. Traditional 
contestation over religion and class had by no means lost their traction, but now the over-
riding conflict was formulated as some sort of postcolonial struggle for national 
emancipation. 
The narrative of a young Ukraine being born out of the debris of the old and the 
corrupt predominated ZLWK WKH QRWLRQ RI µ\RXQJ UHIRUPHUV¶ EHLQJ GHSOR\HG, as it had 
been earlier in Russia under Boris Yeltsin. According to this discourse, Ukraine was now 
paying the price for its failure to conduct radical reforms earlier. The war was not only 
DJDLQVW5XVVLDQLQIOXHQFHEXWDOVRDJDLQVW8NUDLQH¶VRZQSDVWRIPDODGPLQLVWUDWLRn and 
corruption. The whole propaganda machine of liberal internationalism was mobilised to 
shape a discursive framework that was reminiscent of the glad days of the early post-
Soviet period. Ukraine was represented as a laggard now catching up with its western 
QHLJKERXUV$V7RQ\:RRGQRWHVµ:HKDYHEHHQKHUHmany times before: the imaginary 
clash between past and future incarnations of a given country is an especially well-worn 
trope, in which each of the terms is orbited by its cluster of ideologically charged 
signifiers ± dreary / corrupt / bureaucratic / oligarchic / Communist / Baathist vs. vibrant / 
PRGHUQ  HQWUHSUHQHXULDO  GHPRFUDWLF HW FHWHUD¶ (Wood 2015: 122). In Ukraine, this 
ideologically charged dualism is compounded by the geopolitical subtext, with Russia 
representing the old and corrupt, and Europe all that is new and progressive.  
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This was the pervasive motif of the Maidan revolution, which itself was provoked 
by YanukovyFK¶V GHFLVLRQ WR SRVWSRQH VLJQLQJ WKH $$ DJUHHPHQW ZLWK WKH (8 A 
thousand op eds in the Washington Post and articles in the New York Review of Books 
have propounded this simplified version of reality. Often this has taken the form of a 
civilisation discouUVH UHPLQLVFHQW RI 6DPXHO +XQWLQJWRQ¶V GLVTXLVLWLRQV RQ WKH VXEMHFW
but now with the added edge of a deeply orientalist denigration of Russia and its works. 
Wood provides a devastating critique of such simplifications: 
 
These binary oppositions are obviously facile, and based on some embarrassingly 
wrongheaded assumptions: for instance, the idea that the EU could be said to 
VWDQG IRU GHPRFUDF\ RU WKDW D JRYHUQPHQW KHDGHG E\ RQH RI 8NUDLQH¶V ULFKHVW
men could mark a rupture with the oligarchic past. Yet there is another, more 
XQVHWWOLQJFRQWUDGLFWLRQDWZRUNKHUH ,QWRGD\¶VFRQIOLFW5XVVLDLVKHOGWRVWDQG
IRU WKH µROG¶ FRUUXSW ROLJDUFKLF RUGHU %XW 3XWLQLVP LWVHOI LV XOWLPDWHO\ WKH
product of a post-6RYLHWFRXQWU\¶VVXEMHFWLRQWRVKRFNWKHUDS\DQGZDU± in other 
words, of precisely the combination of circumstances that are now supposed to 
EULQJDERXWDµQHZ¶8NUDLQH (Wood 2015: 123). 
 
The monist inflection of the Maidan struggle for dignity represented a shift in discourse 
and practices from the position of an anti-revolution ± challenging the ontological basis 
of the previous conduct of politics, towards a counter-revolution ± a struggle for 
advantage within the binary logic of the old system (Sakwa 2001). The Maidan 
µFRPELQHG MXVW VRFLDO JULHYDQFHV DJDinst the corrupt Yanukovych rule together with 
European illusions and anti-5XVVLDQQDWLRQDOLVP¶,VKFKHQNR,WVRRQµHVFDODWHG
WR OHYHOV RI YLROHQFH WKDW DUH XQSUHFHGHQWHG LQ FRQWHPSRUDU\ 8NUDLQLDQ KLVWRU\¶
(Ishchenko 2016, 7). The violence was used to overthrow the Yanukovych regime and 
DOORZHG VWURQJO\ QDWLRQDOLVWLF IRUFHV µWR VHL]H IXOO FRQWURO RYHU WKH SRVW-revolutionary 
0DLGDQUHJLPH¶+DKQAs always, the means becomes the end.  
Ironically, the novelty and renewal promised by the Maidan revolution was taken 
from the oldest playbook of European history. 7KHFRQFHSWRIµ(XURSH¶EHFDPHWKHSUR[\
for the absence of a substantive ideology of emancipation. ,Q WKLV UHVSHFW WKH µHQG RI
KLVWRU\¶ WKHVLV KDV VRPH WUDFWLRQ LQ WKDW WUDGLWLRQDO VRFLDOLVW OLEHUDWLRQ UKHWRULF ZDV
exhausted, although nationalist discourses were back with a vengeance. In the process, 
the meaning of Europe became radically subverted. Instead of transcending the 
constraints of time and space, the nationalist project concretised EU normativity in 
opposition to what was defined as the imperial hegemon while idealising it as the path 
out of the harsh actually existing conditions. From a post-modern project, the EU became 
subsumed into a harshly modernist struggle for national self-affirmation. Equally, in 
global terms the EU effectively became part of the Atlanticist geopolitical construct, 
which itself could not be more rooted in modern (and pre-modern) conceptualisations of 
the defence of space.  
The Ukraine crisis catalysed processes that had long been in the making. It was 
symptomatic of the larger failure to establish both the institutions and processes that 
could have fostered trust and genuine interdependence between Russia and the EU. This 
is a classic case of failed region building (cf. Slobodchikoff 2014). Instead, on a whole 
series of issues, ranging from the energy relationship to neighbourhood policies, a pattern 
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of antagonistic dependency emerged. These were relationships that both Russia and the 
EU needed but which did not lead to the creation of some sort of partnership community. 
The Ukraine syndrome of the blocked political articulation of alternatives applied to 
Europe as a whole, where language and discourse systematically marginalised challenges 
to the order that patently tended towards the amplification of division and conflict. The 
suppression of genuine dialogue only intensified the scapegoating mechanism, in both 
Ukraine and Europe, as the contradiction between stymied articulation and marginalised 
narratives grew increasingly wide.  
 The crisis affects not only the geographical borderlands between the EU and 
Russia, but also the broader understanding of the contemporary European order. 
Temporal and spatial configurations have come into conflict. The monism of the EU 
encompasses both dimensions. In terms of space, engagement with non-EU countries has 
been monological and didactic. The engagement and learning has been entirely one way, 
ZLWK(XURSH¶VQHLJKERXUVKDYLQJWRHQJDJHZLWKWKH(8RQWKHODWWHU¶VWHUPVThe logic 
of European integration and the wider Europe agenda is hostile to difference, and instead 
assumes a uniform process of conditionality and enlargement, however differentiated the 
actual integration mechanisms. This uniformity is the price to pay to take advantage of 
what the EU has to offer, above all an enormous market and a set of regulatory, political 
and human rights norms that offer the prospect for dynamic liberal capitalist 
development. It does not always work out that way, but that at least is the promise. The 
EU engages in a deeply transformative relationship with its neighbours, and the price to 
pay is acceptance of the subaltern relationship of pupil WRWKH(8¶VWHDFKHU 
7KH UHODWLRQVKLS LVTXDOLWDWLYHO\GLIIHUHQW IURP WKDWEHWZHHQ+HJHO¶V0DVWHUDQG
Slave, yet the inevitable hierarchy was too much for Russia to swallow, provoking the 
severe deterioration of the relationship. Critics argue that Russia¶V UHIXVDO WR HQJDJH LQ
the transformative process provoked the breakdown, whereas µXQGHUVWDQGHUV¶VXJJHVWWKDW
the question was one of autonomy, both in terms of political sovereignty and of historical 
experience. The member states may have resolved a range of historical problems within 
the format of the EU, but these solutions could not automatically be applied to a country 
as vast and complex as Russia ± which had to find its own way to solve the problems of 
its history. In the end, incompatible understandings of the challenges posed by 
contemporary temporality shifted onto the plane of spatial confrontation in the 
borderlands.    
 The failure to establish a dialogue of difference between the actually existing 
components of Europe provoked the breakdown of 2014. The ascription of a certain non-
Europeanness to Russia ± with Europe described in the monist terms outlined above ± 
inhibited the instantiation of a dialogical relationship in which both the European self and 
the Russian other could have engaged in a mutual learning process. The argument that 
there is not much that the EU could learn from Russia is valid to the degree that learning 
is restricted to a narrow platform of normative and institutional interactions, whereas a 
broader learning agenda would include the problem of how multiple entities can create a 
fruitful relationship on the continent. For this a pan-continental greater Europe agenda 
would complement the Brussels-centric wider European agenda. The beginning of any 
learning process is acknowledgment of the need to learn. Prozorov argues that this would 




DQ ³LQWHUQDWLRQDO´ UDWKHU WKDQ D ³GRPHVWLF´ DFWRU ZLWK RWKHU (XURSHDQ DFWRUV ZKLFK
unlike the EU, are sovereign states, but no less equal to the EU in the common space of 
SOXUDOLVWLF LQWHUDFWLRQ¶ (Prozorov 2016: 183). In his view, this would shift the basis of 
relaWLRQV DZD\ IURP 5XVVLD¶V µSUREOHPDWLF VWDWXV¶ LQ WKH IUDPHZRUN RI (XURSHDQ
LQWHJUDWLRQWRZDUGVZKDWKHWHUPVDSURMHFWRIµFRPPRQ(XURSHDQSOXUDOLVP¶, where the 
µORJLFRIFRPPRQ(XURSHDQSOXUDOLVPVHHNVWRPDLQWDLQ(XURSHDVDVSDFHRISOXUDOLVWLF
interaction, in which commonality is ensured by the mutual recognition of legitimate 
GLIIHUHQFH DQG WKH UHOD[DWLRQ RI WKH ULJLG GHOLPLWDWLRQ RI RQWRSRORJLFDO LGHQWLWLHV¶ 
(Prozorov 2016: 184). This would be a common European home with many rooms but 




Russia and Europe no longer share a common topos or logos. Kissinger (2016) notes that 
µGLVFXVVLRQV>EHWZHHQ5XVVLDDQGWKH:HVW@KDYHWDNHQSODFHRXWVLGHDQDJUHHGVWUDWHJLF
IUDPHZRUN¶ +H FDOOV IRU 8NUDLQH µWR EH HPEHGGHG LQ WKH VWUXFWXUH RI (XURSHDQ DQG
international security architecture in such a way that it serves as a bridge between Russia 
DQG WKH :HVW UDWKHU WKDQ DV DQ RXWSRVW RI HLWKHU VLGH¶ 2Q ERWK VLGHV WKH internal 
contradictions and external antagonisms were never resolved, and it was these which in 
the end precipitated the global Ukrainian and European crisis. A contradiction, unlike an 
antinomy, is capable of resolution, and it is in that sense that the term is applied here. The 
redefinition of both norms and space in pluralistic terms offers just such a resolution. 
However, for this to be achieved both the EU and Ukraine will have to change their 
strategies. The EU faces numerous internal and external crises, to the degree that its very 
survival is in question, yet perhaps the fundamental question that has never been 
adequately addressed is the vision of continental order that it could envisage that includes 
Russia as an equal and autonomous entity. Equally, building Ukrainian statehood on the 
worst monist postulate of enduring separation and conflict with Russia is hardly likely to 
achieve either prosperity or peace for the tortured country.  
The scapegoating of Russia is hardly conducive to the resolution of the internal 
contradictions within both the EU and Ukraine. Russia actions are argued to have to have 
created the conditions for the internal consolidation of Ukraine that will finally allow 
reforms of society and the economy (Lough and Solonenko 2016). Instead, an unholy 
alliance has formed between the EU and the nationalist regime in Kiev, a negative 
consensus that negates the liberal pluralism was once associated with European 
integration. The greater European project, to which the Putinite elite remains committed, 
is not about spheres of influence but the creation of conditions where such a dynamic can 
be transcended. Discussion of these issues has always carried a powerful antagonistic 
charge, but after 2013 assumed a toxic polarised quality that inhibits dispassionate 
analysis. This has now become part of the Ukraine syndrome, which allows the 
contradictions to become the subject of political speculation and the debased currency of 
SROLWLFDOH[FKDQJH$OORI8NUDLQH¶VSRVW-communist leaders have failed to come up with 
strategies for the resolution of contradictions, and instead with varying degrees of 
incompetence have exploited them for short-term political gain. On the European level, 
WKH(8¶VLQDELOLW\WRGHYLVHDPRGHRIUHFRQFLOLDWLRQZLWKRWKHUSURMHFWLRQVRI(XURSHDQ
space undermines its own normativity. The monism of Europe and Ukraine reinforce 
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